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Stranded wealth: rethinking the politics of oil in an age of abundance 




Even if oil prices have recovered from their plunge in 2014, this article argues that the oil 
industry is unlikely to return to the status quo ex ante. Two profound shifts in technology and 
markets are dramatically changing the longer-term outlook for the oil industry. In the short 
term, traditional producers will feel persistent pressure from the shale revolution, a disruptive 
technology that has altered the cost curve and elasticity of oil supply. In the medium term, the 
industry must confront a structural slowdown and eventual peak in demand owing to innovation 
and evolving consumer preferences, related in part to concerns over climate change. Together, 
these shifts reflect a new energy order in which oil is no longer an exhaustible resource, new 
trading patterns emerge, and oil prices exhibit greater short-term volatility amid a long-term 
declining trend. These new rules of the game force us to reconsider some of the theories and 
concepts of the international political economy of oil. We flag three key political effects from 
these market shifts: (1) key oil-producing states face economic and political turmoil; (2) the 
Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) cannot influence the price of oil in 
the long term by cutting output; and (3) power is redistributed in the international system. 
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Oil is the world’s most traded commodity and the global economy’s single most important 
energy source, so any significant change in its price can have far-reaching economic 
consequences. Large swings in the price of oil typically also have major knock-on effects on 
international relations because petroleum plays a pivotal role in shaping global and domestic 
politics.1 Oil prices tend to generate headlines only when they go up, but downward movements 
can be just as significant in their effects.  
 
Since the 1980s, the oil industry has experienced six episodes of significant oil price decline.2 
The most recent began in June 2014, when crude oil prices fell from more than US$110 a barrel 
to less than US$50 a barrel in the span of just six months. The price bottomed out at around 
US$27 a barrel in January 2016, before gradually recovering as OPEC and Russia coordinated 
efforts by producers to balance the market. In 2018, geopolitical factors—notably the 
impending reimposition of sanctions on Iran by the Trump administration and the political and 
economic crisis in Venezuela—have pushed prices up to around US$80.3  
 
Many observers see the latest oil price fall and rise as no different from previous oil price cycles. 
The reports and projections of international institutions such as the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) suggest that there will be a sustained price recovery over the next few years because of 
deferred investment in upstream capacity, a gradual drawdown of inventories and continued 
growth in demand.4 Thus, the supply cuts that oil producers from within and beyond OPEC 
have jointly implemented since January 2017 are only setting the stage for the next boom-and-
bust cycle for oil markets.5 
 
Yet, even if oil markets are starting to ‘rebalance’, this article argues that the oil industry is 
unlikely to return to the status quo ex ante. Two profound shifts in technology and markets are 
dramatically changing the longer-term outlook for the oil industry. In the short term, traditional 
producers will feel persistent pressure from the shale revolution, the advent of a disruptive 
                                               
1 Susan Strange, States and markets (London: Bloomsbury, 1994); Gavin Bridge and Philippe Le Billon, Oil 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2017). 
2 John Baffes, M. Aykan Kose, Franziska Ohnsorge and Marc Stocker, The great plunge in oil prices: causes, 
consequences and policy responses (Washington DC: World Bank, March 2015).  
3 Oil price data were obtained from https://ycharts.com/indicators/brent_crude_oil_spot_price, 27 Sept. 2018. 
(Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 3 Oct. 2018.) 
4 See e.g. IEA, Oil 2017: analysis and forecasts to 2022 (Paris, 2017). 
5 Robert McNally, Crude volatility: the history and the future of boom and bust oil prices (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2017). 
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technology that has altered the cost curve and elasticity of oil supply. The ‘fracking’ boom has 
demonstrated that oil and gas are not in imminent short supply, but rather characterized by 
abundance, even at relatively low prices. In the medium term, the industry must confront a 
structural slowdown and eventual peak in demand owing to innovation and evolving consumer 
preferences, related in part to concerns over climate change.6 Together, these shifts reflect a 
new energy order in which oil is no longer an exhaustible resource, new trading patterns emerge, 
and oil prices exhibit greater short-term volatility amid a long-term declining trend. 
 
These new rules of the game force us to reconsider some of the theories and concepts of the 
international political economy (IPE) of oil. The proposition of the ‘resource curse’, for 
example, has always been predicated on political pathologies resulting from the abundance and 
volatility of resource rents. But, as the impact of the 2014 oil price collapse illustrates, for many 
fossil fuel exporting countries future crises will result from the loss of those resource rents.7 
Similarly, the relative balance of power in the oil industry will shift in this new energy order. 
Whereas in the past oil companies (notably the ‘Seven Sisters’)8 and host governments (notably 
those of OPEC countries) have attempted to set up distinct oil governance regimes, they will be 
less able to dictate the rules of the game in a market characterized by shrinking demand and 
abundant reserves. Finally, the notion that oil is an important component of ‘structural power’ 
and hegemony needs to be rethought if oil is increasingly displaced by low-carbon sources of 
energy in the global drive to decarbonize the economy. In such a world, oil-importing states 
will see economic and political advantage in promoting domestic renewable energy production 
at the expense of costly oil and gas imports. 
 
This article proceeds as follows. The next section offers a review and a critique of the existing 
literature on the IPE of oil. In the following section, we develop our argument that the oil 
industry is being upended by two structural transformations in supply and demand. In the 
subsequent section, we reflect on how these secular shifts necessitate a rethink of key notions 
and theories related to the IPE of energy.  
 
                                               
6 Kingsmill Bond, 2020 vision: why you should see peak fossil fuels coming (London: Carbon Tracker Initiative, 
2018). 
7 Siân Bradley, Glada Lahn and Steve Pye, Carbon risk and resilience: how energy transition is changing the 
prospects for developing countries with fossil fuels (London: Chatham House, 2018). 
8 The ‘Seven Sisters’ refers to a handful of giant western oil companies that dominated the global oil industry 
from 1928 to the 1960s: Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum, Gulf, Exxon, Mobil, Texaco and Chevron.  
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The IPE of oil: rentier states, market governance and structural power 
Control over and trade in fossil fuels—particularly oil—has long been a cornerstone of the 
contemporary IPE. Petroleum is indispensable for the movement of people and goods, 
supplying no less than 93 per cent of the energy used for transportation across the world.9 
Without oil, international trade in merchandise would virtually come to a standstill. Moreover, 
the dollar denomination of international trade in oil helps to underpin the United States’ 
monetary power and contributes to the accumulation of extensive ‘petrodollar’ reserves in oil-
exporting states during boom times,10 a major cause of global macroeconomic imbalances.11 
Petroleum companies are among the biggest and most-valued multinational corporations in the 
world, often wielding substantial political influence.12 Oil also warps the domestic politics of 
producer countries and shapes global patterns of conflict and cooperation.13  
 
Oil, in short, is critically linked to almost all major issues in IPE, including international 
security, trade, money, sovereign debt, tax and welfare, and global poverty and development. 
It is fair to say that the current global political economy is underpinned by a fossil fuel energy 
system that affords economic power and political influence to particular states and companies. 
The centrality of fossil fuels—particularly energy-dense oil—has created what DiMuzio calls 
a ‘petro-market civilization’.14 It is thus perfectly understandable that major theories and 
debates about the IPE of energy should be premised on the centrality of oil, including 
                                               
9 IEA, Oil 2017. 
10 David E. Spero, The hidden hand of American hegemony: petrodollar recycling and international markets 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). 
11 Rabah Arezki and Fuad Hasanov, ‘Global imbalances and petrodollars’, World Economy 36: 2, 2012, pp. 213–
32. 
12 Steve Coll, Private empire: ExxonMobil and American power (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2012). 
13 Michael L. Ross, The oil curse: how petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012); Jeff. D. Colgan, Petro-aggression: when oil causes war (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
14 Tim DiMuzio, ‘Capitalizing a future unsustainable: finance, energy and the fate of market civilization’, Review 
of International Political Economy 19: 3, 2012, pp. 363–88. 
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controversies over the resource curse,15 oil and democracy,16 rentier states,17 peak oil,18 energy 
security,19 private and national oil companies,20 and resource wars.21  
 
Many of these debates have their roots in the oil-related turbulence of the 1970s. Energy 
markets have changed considerably since then, but academic scholarship has not kept pace.22 It 
prompted Robert Keohane, one of the pioneers in the field of IPE, to observe that ‘the demand 
for analysis of the causes and consequences of oil price fluctuations surely exceeds by far the 
supply of serious scholarship on the subject’.23 Here we seek to heed Keohane’s call for more 
research into the structural changes that occur in the international oil market, and how they 
challenge some of the key concepts that have underpinned much of the current work on the 
global political economy of energy. 
 
In doing so, this article ties into three different strands in the literature. First, it relates to 
literature on ‘rentier states’, that is, states that rely heavily on revenue from the export of natural 
resources.24 Many oil rentier states have been plagued by poor economic performance, low 
                                               
15 Ross, The oil curse. 
16 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon democracy: political power in the age of oil (London: Verso, 2011). 
17 e.g. Alexander A. Cooley, ‘Booms and busts: theorizing institutional formation and change in oil states’, 
Review of International Political Economy 8: 1, 2001, pp. 163–80. 
18 e.g. Jörg Friedrichs, The future is not what it used to be: climate change and energy scarcity (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2013)  
19 e.g. Andrew Cheon and Johannes Urpelainen, ‘Escaping oil’s stranglehold: when do states invest in energy 
security?’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 59: 6, 2015, pp. 953–83. 
20 e.g. Paul Stevens, ‘National oil companies and international oil companies in the Middle East: under the 
shadow of government and the resource nationalism cycle’, Journal of World Energy Law and Business 1: 1, 
2008, pp. 5–30; Jonas Meckling, Bo Kong and Tanvi Madan, ‘Oil and state capitalism: government–firm 
coopetition in China and India’, Review of International Political Economy 22: 6, 2015, pp. 1159–87. 
21 e.g. Colgan, Petro-aggression. 
22 Kathleen J. Hancock and Vlado Vivoda, ‘International political economy: a field born of the OPEC crisis 
returns to its energy roots’, Energy Research and Social Science 1, March 2014, pp. 206–16; Thijs Van de Graaf, 
Benjamin K. Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern and Michael T. Klare, ‘States, markets, and institutions: 
integrating international political economy and global energy politics’, in Thijs Van de Graaf, Benjamin K. 
Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern and Michael T. Klare, eds, The Palgrave handbook of the 
international political economy of energy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 3–44.  
23 Robert O. Keohane, ‘The old IPE and the new’, Review of International Political Economy 16: 1, 2009, pp. 34–
46 at p. 41. 
24 Hossein Mahdavy, ‘The patterns and problems of economic development in rentier states: the case of Iran’, in 
M. A. Cook, ed., Studies in the economic history of the Middle East: from the rise of Islam to the present day 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 428–67; Rolf Schwarz, ‘The political economy of state-formation 
in the Arab Middle East: rentier states, economic reform, and democratization’, Review of International Political 
Economy 15: 4, 2008, pp. 599–621. 
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levels of democracy and civil war.25 This so-called ‘resource curse’ continues to be intensely 
debated, but very few scholars have contemplated the implications for this line of thinking of 
structural shifts in the global supply and demand of oil, or for that matter the implications of 
the shale revolution and its different infrastructure needs and production profile.26 An exception 
is Sinn’s thesis of the ‘green paradox’, which states that climate policies such as carbon taxes 
may end up increasing emissions since they could lead owners of fossil fuel resources to 
accelerate extraction.27 Likewise, Friedrichs and Inderwildi propose the concept of the ‘carbon 
curse’ to describe the phenomenon whereby fuel-rich countries appear doomed to high carbon 
intensity.28 A recent study by Chatham House has paid particular attention to the implications 
of commitments to address climate change and decarbonization for developing countries 
moving into fossil fuel exploitation.29 Beyond these examples, however, the resource curse 
debate is still largely disconnected from broader issues of climate change and decarbonization.  
 
Second, this analysis connects to the literature on stabilizing and managing volatile 
(commodity) markets. Most of the work in this area has focused on commodity cartels such as 
the Seven Sisters and OPEC.30 There has been little attention so far within the mainstream IPE 
field to the governance and regulation of commodity (derivative) markets.31 The emerging 
literature on global energy governance has focused predominantly on the role of international 
institutions such as the IEA and the G20 in governing the energy question writ large, and tells 
                                               
25 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, Natural resource abundance and economic growth, working paper 
no. 5398 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995); Michael L. Ross, ‘Does oil hinder 
democracy?’, World Politics 53: 3, 2001, pp. 325–61; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and grievance in 
civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers 56: 4, 2004, pp. 536–95; Richard M. Auty, Sustaining development in 
mineral economies: the resource curse thesis (London: Routledge, 1993).  
26 George Shambaugh and Aaron Taylor, ‘The energy revolution: a resource blessing or a resource curse?’, 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 16: 2, Summer–Fall 2015, pp. 206–16. 
27 Hans-Werner Sinn, The green paradox: a supply-side approach to global warming (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2012). 
28 Jörg Friedrichs and Oliver R. Inderwildi, ‘The carbon curse: are fuel rich countries doomed to high CO2 
intensities?’, Energy Policy 62, November 2013, pp. 1356–65. 
29 Bradley et al., Carbon risk and resilience. 
30 Edith Penrose, The large international firm in developing countries: the international petroleum industry 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968); Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: the great oil companies and the 
world they shaped (New York: Viking, 1975); Ian Skeet, OPEC: twenty-five years of prices and politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Dag Harald Claes, The politics of oil-producer cooperation: 
the political economy of global interdependence (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002); Jeff D. Colgan, ‘The emperor 
has no clothes: the limits of OPEC in the global oil market’, International Organization 68: 3, 2014, pp. 599–
623. 
31 Jennifer Clapp and Eric Helleiner, ‘International political economy and the environment: back to the basics?’, 
International Affairs 88: 3, May 2012, pp. 485–501. 
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us little about the specific mechanisms of governance in today’s oil market.32 This leaves 
largely unexplored the question of how the oil market can be managed in the light of structural 
shifts on both the demand and the supply side. 
 
Third, it connects to scholarship on the relationship between energy and the global distribution 
of power. Susan Strange has argued that ‘energy is the sine qua non for the exercise of power 
in the international political economy’ because it is so essential for the pursuit of wealth and 
security.33 The structure of international oil markets—characterized by the strong position of 
American corporations, North America’s relative energy self-sufficiency, and the dollar 
denomination of oil trade—continues to underpin the global hegemony of the United States.34 
Structural shifts in the oil market could, therefore, transform economic and power dynamics in 
the global political economy. Some studies have examined the impact of the shale revolution,35 
but far fewer scholars have examined the geopolitics of a shift away from oil to renewable 
energy and other energy sources.36 
 
The old oil order and forces of disruption 
Oil has never been subject to a comprehensive international regime. Instead, it has been subject 
to several ‘imposed orders’, designed to advance the interests of one or just a few dominant 
actors.37 The Seven Sisters oil cartel, set up in the period between the two world wars, was the 
first such order. It consisted of a series of vertically integrated oil companies, linked by formal 
cartel arrangements. This order began to unravel in the context of decolonization. It was 
replaced by the OPEC-led order in the late 1960s, when oil-producing states succeeded in 
wresting control of production and prices from the international majors. Alarmed by the 1973 
oil shock, the United States took the lead in setting up an oil consumers’ regime centred on the 
IEA. This order came to be based on liberal markets and progressive financialization.  
 
                                               
32 Thijs Van de Graaf and Jeff D. Colgan, ‘Global energy governance: a review and research agenda’, Palgrave 
Communications, 2016, DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2015.47. 
33 Strange, States and markets, p. 209.  
34 Simon Bromley, American hegemony and world oil: the industry, the state system and the world economy 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991).  
35 e.g. David H. Dunn and Mark J. L. McClelland, ‘Shale gas and the revival of American power: debunking 
decline?’, International Affairs 89: 6, Nov. 2013, pp. 1411–28.  
36 Daniel Scholten, ed., The geopolitics of renewables (New York: Springer, 2018).  
37 Oran R. Young, Resource regimes: natural resources and social institutions (Berkeley: University of 
California Press), p. 105. 
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Since the turn of the millennium, this liberal order has gradually ceded ground to a new order, 
driven in large part by China’s thirst for oil imports and characterized by a comeback of the 
state and a bilateralization of energy relations. In this state capitalist order, international oil 
relations are again framed predominantly in geopolitical terms such as ‘scarcity’ and ‘access to 
fields’. When oil prices reached their all-time high in July 2008, there was a widespread belief 
that peak oil had finally arrived. It was assumed that soaring energy demand from China and 
other rising powers, coupled with the rapid depletion of conventional oil fields, would only 
intensify the scramble for oil and gas reserves. The projections of ever-rising energy demand 
added to the belief that oil prices would keep on rising, and that the power of OPEC and other 
big producers such as Russia would only grow.38 
 
Two major shifts now have the potential to overturn that view: the shale or fracking revolution; 
and the looming global shift away from hydrocarbons. A key difference between the two trends 
is that the shale oil revolution is an ongoing trend, while peak oil demand has not (yet) 
materialized. We now consider each trend, before discussing the new oil order that will ensue. 
 
Shale shocked: the fracking revolution 
The shale or fracking revolution has been a game changer for international oil and gas markets. 
It involves a combination of three techniques, each of which had been developed separately, 
that made it possible for companies to free the gas and oil molecules that are trapped in layers 
of shale rock. They are: horizontal drilling, seismic imaging, and the ability to use hydraulic 
pressure to split, or ‘fracture’, the rock to release trapped hydrocarbons. The unique mineral 
ownership system of the United States, whereby the subsurface rights are in private hands for 
private gain, served as a key enabling condition, which allowed the fracking revolution to 
develop extremely quickly. After remaining flat for around a decade, US natural gas production 
suddenly took off in 2007. By 2009, the United States had overtaken Russia as the world’s 
largest gas producer.39 In the same year, fracking also pushed US oil production up again after 
                                               
38 James D. Hamilton, The changing face of world oil markets, working paper no. 20355 (Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014); Michael T. Klare, Rising powers, shrinking planet: the new 
geopolitics of energy (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009); Michael T. Klare, The race for what’s left 
(London: Picador, 2012). 
39 BP, Statistical review of world energy 2017 (London, 2017).  
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a decade-long decline (see figure 1). In July 2018, the US produced almost 11 million barrels 
of oil per day (mb/d), an all-time high.40  
 
Figure 1: Yearly crude oil production of selected countries, 1973–2018 
 
 
Source: US Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, 8 Oct. 2018, tables 
11.1a and 11.1b, https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/#international.  
Note: Figure for 2018 is based on average for period January-June. 
 
The shale boom has created global ripple effects. The US Congress lifted the 40-year-old export 
ban on crude oil in December 2015, and in February 2016 the United States also began 
exporting cargoes of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Other countries also have large oil- and gas-
rich shale deposits, and many of them are eager to develop these reserves. It is not possible, 
however, simply to cut and paste the US shale success in other countries. For instance, China, 
Argentina and Algeria are estimated to have larger shale gas resources than the United States, 
                                               































































but their production might be constrained by a range of issues, such as insufficient access to 
water.41 As yet, then, it remains uncertain how far the shale revolution will spread beyond the 
United States.42 
 
The unexpected shale boom was part of a broader surge in oil and gas production. Just as the 
oil shocks of the 1970s had ushered in the development of new oil provinces, notably the North 
Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, so the price rises after 2000 led to an increase in exploration 
spending.43 This flurry of exploration activity has resulted in major discoveries of new 
conventional oil and gas fields. The increased spending on exploration also shifted the frontiers 
of drilling, notably to the deeper offshore, the Arctic and the Canadian tar sands. More recently, 
some of the established Middle Eastern producers, most notably Iraq and Iran, have increased 
their production after decades of wars and sanctions (see figure 1). The global pool of available 
liquid fuels has further expanded thanks to increased production of biofuels (now supplying the 
equivalent of 1.7 mb/d) and natural gas liquids (contributing as much as 16.2 mb/d):44 none of 
this has anything to do with oil extraction, but it all adds further to the oil glut.45 
 
The shale oil boom stands out, however, because it has changed the cost curve and elasticity of 
oil supply. The fracking industry operates on a much shorter investment cycle than the 
conventional oil industry: upfront costs are relatively low; lead times and payback times are 
short. Unlike wells in conventional reservoirs, which decline at around 6 per cent per year, tight 
oil wells46 typically decline by about 60 per cent in the first year and 25 per cent in the second 
year of production, although shale producers are able to extract more oil from new wells as 
drilling techniques and technology improve.47 There is no real exploration process to speak of 
                                               
41 EIA, ‘World shale resource assessments’, 2015, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/. 
42 Roberto F. Aguilera and Marian Radetzki, The price of oil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); R. 
Quintin Grafton, Ian G. Cronshaw and Michael C. Moore, Risks, rewards and regulation of unconventional gas 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Thijs Van de Graaf, Tim Haesebrouck and Peter Debaere, 
‘Fractured politics? The comparative regulation of shale gas in Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy 89: 
6, Nov. 2013, pp. 1411–28 
43 EIA, ‘Today in energy: global upstream oil and gas spending continues to favor exploration and development’, 
2016, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=16011. 
44 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2017 (Paris, 2017), p. 15. 
45 Natural gas liquids are light hydrocarbons that exist in liquid form underground and are produced together with 
natural gas and recovered in separation plants or processing plants. 
46 In the US, oil extracted from shale rock with fracking is typically referred to as ‘light, tight oil’. We use it 
interchangeably with the term ‘shale oil’. 




because the location and broad characteristics of the main ‘plays’ are well known. The time 
from an investment decision to actual production is measured in months, rather than years, 
making the light tight oil industry far nimbler and more responsive to price signals than its 
conventional counterpart.48 The result is that shale oil could keep a lid on oil prices in the years 
ahead, which might keep those prices, and thereby oil revenues for exporters, lower for longer. 
In such a world, cost competitiveness will be critical, and oil companies making investment 
decisions with 20- to 30-year time horizons will need to be wary of saddling themselves with 
too much high-cost production. 
 
The shale industry has also been remarkably resilient in the face of falling prices since mid-
2014. While the number of active drilling rigs declined precipitously as oil prices fell, 
production responded more slowly: it took more than a year, until November 2015, to halt the 
shale industry’s year-on-year growth in output. Some fracking companies had hedged future 
production in derivatives markets, thus locking in higher prices, while others were required to 
go on producing to keep their leases or to meet interest payments.49 Still, even though some 
shale companies have gone bankrupt, and most of them have very high levels of debt,50 overall 
the sector has succeeded in cutting down costs thanks to technological innovation and 
streamlined production processes.51 The productivity gains are related to the fact that fracking 
is more akin to a standardized, manufacturing-like process, unlike the one-off, large-scale 
engineering projects that characterize many conventional oil enterprises.52  
 
The IEA expects US tight oil output to grow by 8 million barrels per day from 2010 to 2025, 
making this the ‘highest sustained period of oil output growth by a single country in the history 
of oil markets’.53 Growth on that scale would allow the United States to become a net oil 
exporter from the late 2020s. However, the IEA also expects that over around the same period, 
                                               
48 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2015 (Paris, 2015). 
49 McNally, Crude volatility. 
50 Dietrich Domanski, Jonathan Kearns, Marco Lombardi and Hyun Song Shin, ‘Oil and debt’, BIS Quarterly 
Review, March 2015, pp. 55–65. 
51 It is interesting to note that easy access to capital was the essential ‘fuel’ that enabled the fracking revolution. 
The shale boom would not have happened in the same way had global interest rates not been close to zero, with 
central banks using large-scale quantitative easing to stimulate the economy in the wake of the Great Recession 
of 2007–2008. See Spencer Dale, ‘New economics of oil’, paper presented to Society of Business Economists 
Annual Conference, London, 13 Oct. 2015, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/speeches/2015/new-
economics-of-oil-spencer-dale.pdf. 
52 Dale, ‘New economics of oil’. 
53 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2017, p. 26. 
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US tight oil will begin to plateau and non-OPEC production as a whole to fall back.54 The 
upshot is that the market becomes increasingly reliant on the Middle East to balance supply and 
demand—that is, at least, if demand grows as projected; which is far from certain, as we argue 
below. 
 
The spectre of peak oil demand 
Historically, oil demand has grown in step with economic output. Since 1965, oil consumption 
has risen from about 30 mb/d to close to 100 mb/d in 2018.55 Most scenarios project world oil 
demand to continue growing for the next two decades. The IEA’s ‘new policies’ scenario, for 
instance, foresees an increase of 10 per cent in world oil demand from 2016 to 2040; and under 
a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario, the IEA even forecasts an increase in world oil demand of 24.8 
per cent.56 The energy outlooks of OPEC and international oil companies all project similar 
demand growth (see table 1). The only exceptions are ‘normative’ scenarios that take climate 
goals into account, such as the IEA’s ‘sustainable development’ scenario57 or Shell’s ‘Sky’ 
scenario,58 which project a decline in oil demand.  
 
                                               
54 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2017. 
55 BP, Statistical review of world energy 2018.  
56 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2017, p. 79. 
57 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2017.  




Table 1: Projected change in oil demand under different scenarios  











Shell Oceans scenario 2010–40 +28.1 +0.94 
IEA Current policies 2016–40 +24.8 +0.9 
BP Energy Outlook 2035 2015–35 +15 +0.75 
ExxonMobil Outlook for Energy – A View to 2040 2015–40 +18 +0.72 
OPEC Reference case, World Oil Outlook 
2017 
2015–40 +16.4 +0.6 
IEA New policies scenario 2016–40 +10.1 +0.4 
Shell Mountains scenario 2010–40 +9.0 +0.3 
IEA Sustainable development scenario 2016–40 −24.7 −1.2 
Shell Sky scenario 2016–2100 −73.3 −1.51 
Sources: BP, Energy outlook 2035 (London, 2014); ExxonMobil, The outlook for energy: A 
view to 2040 (Irving, 2016); IEA, World Energy Outlook 2017 (Paris, 2017); OPEC, World Oil 
Outlook (Vienna, 2017); Shell, New Lens Scenarios: A Shift in Perspective for a World in 
Transition (The Hague, 2013)-; Shell, Sky scenario (The Hague, 2018). 
 
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that oil demand will continue to grow unabatedly as 
it did in the past. To begin with, every single projection in table 1 shows a slowdown in oil 
demand growth below the historical annual rate of 2.27 per cent recorded between 1965 and 
2016.59 The secular trend is that the global economy is decoupling from oil consumption, with 
less oil burned per unit of GDP. This decline in oil intensity is related to advances in energy 
efficiency and oil substitution in sectors such as power generation, buildings and industry. As 
a result, the share of oil in total primary energy consumption dropped from 48.7 per cent in 
1973 to 33.3 per cent in 2016 (see figure 2). In other words, the world has been switching away 
from oil for decades.  
 
 
                                               
59 BP, Statistical review of world energy 2017. 
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Figure 2: Oil’s share in world energy consumption and real oil prices, 1966–2017 
 
 
Note: Real oil price in constant 2017 US$.  
Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2018. 
 
Of course, oil could lose market share but still grow in absolute terms, just as coal did relative 
to oil and gas in the twentieth century.60 Yet future oil demand growth hinges on a small number 
of countries (80 per cent of incremental demand comes from China and India alone) and a 
shrinking set of sectors (petrochemicals, aviation, shipping and freight) where growth is 
supposed to offset declines in all—and we mean all—other countries and sectors.61 As a result, 
such projections are very sensitive to growth expectations for these few remaining growth 
markets. If only one country or sector does not grow as assumed, or if the global economy 
remains mired in secular stagnation,62 this could change the picture for the oil industry as a 
whole. With China’s economy shifting gears,63 and the International Maritime Organization 
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(IMO) and International Civil Aviation Organization adopting standards for the aviation and 
shipping sectors, the risks to oil demand are tilted to the downside. In 2016, for example, the 
IMO set a global sulphur limit on fuel oil that will take effect in 2020, and in 2018 it also 
adopted a strategy to reduce carbon emissions from the shipping sector by at least 50 per cent 
compared with 2008 levels by 2050. While the first regulation will shift demand towards middle 
distillates (thus representing a challenge to Middle Eastern oil producers, which pump high-
sulphur crude), the latter strategy implies that new vessels capable of running on fuels other 
than oil will need to start coming into service in the 2030s (thus representing a challenge to all 
oil exporters).  
 
Even if these key markets grow as assumed, technological and market shifts might start to 
challenge the dominant position of oil much more quickly than many assume. The 
transportation sector, oil’s key stronghold, is widely believed to be on the cusp of a major 
transformation, with the advent of electric vehicles (EVs), automated driving and ride-sharing. 
The full impact of such changes remains to be seen—for example, the use of self-driving cars 
might lead to more miles logged, which might increase demand for fuels—but the potential for 
disruptive change is there, especially if the three models are combined. Efficiency 
improvements in internal combustion engines could take a bite out of oil demand even before 
EVs come into the picture, and ‘modal shifts’ (to non-car based transportation means like public 
transport or electric bicycles) should be added into the equation as well. India, for example, has 
the opportunity to pursue an alternative urban transit model that would allow it to leapfrog the 
US car-centric model. There are also signs that attitudes towards car ownership are changing 
with the emphasis on different models for mobility, particularly in large cities, with talk now 
of ‘peak car’ in the OECD.64 Oil demand in the petrochemical sector is vulnerable too, since 
the products it produces (e.g., plastics, cosmetics, fertilizers and synthetic cloths) can also be 
manufactured from natural gas and biomass-based feedstock. There is also a growing backlash 
against (single-use) plastics following revelations that there will be more plastic than fish in the 
world’s oceans by 2050, and that microplastics are finding their way into the food chain, posing 
significant threats to health.65 
                                               
64 Stefan Nicola and Elisabeth Behrmann, Peak car and the end of an industry, Bloomberg, 17 Aug. 2018, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-17/-peak-car-and-the-end-of-an-industry. 
65 Ellen MacArthur Foundation, The new plastics economy: rethinking the future of plastics, Jan. 2016, 
https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/publications/the-new-plastics-economy-rethinking-the-future-of-
plastics; Peter Dauvergne, ‘The power of environmental norms: marine plastic pollution and the politics of 




Energy scenarios are notorious for missing disruptive trends. Few organizations predicted the 
dramatic fall in costs of alternative energy technologies such as photovoltaic solar, wind and 
batteries that have occurred over the past couple of years.66 In fact, organizations such as the 
IEA have received fierce criticism for systematically underestimating the potential of solar and 
wind energy. While it is difficult to predict the future, the adoption of new technologies 
typically follows an S-curve, starting from an initial period of slow growth before reaching a 
tipping point of fast adoption.67 Moreover, recent studies have challenged the mainstream view 
that energy transitions are necessarily slow, protracted affairs.68 Research from the IMF shows 
that, if the displacement of horses by motor vehicles in the early twentieth century provides any 
guide, EVs could make up 93 per cent of the vehicle stock by 2040.69  
 
Most projections show a much slower rate of adoption, but a small change is often enough to 
wreak havoc on the incumbents. It took just an 8 per cent increase in market share for 
renewables to strip €100 billion from the value of European utilities between 2008 and 2013, 
and a 10 per cent loss of market share in the power sector to push the US coal industry to the 
brink of collapse.70 In this sense, it is worth noting that investors and insurers are increasingly 
aware of the risks that fossil fuel assets pose. Shareholders have made oil corporations discuss 
the risks to their strategies posed by climate policy, major funds have committed to divest from 
fossil fuels, and oil firms have been sued in court for contributing to climate change. These and 
other actions may signal a global normative turn against fossil fuels, reminiscent of the way 
that norms have historically shifted about slavery, women’s suffrage, whaling and tobacco.71 
The possibility of such a trend may undercut the oil industry’s social licence to operate and—
to the extent that large investors are coming on board—also hinder the industry’s access to 
finance. 
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As these norms shift, government policies to mitigate the financial and environmental costs of 
oil consumption can also make a huge dent in global oil demand. A prime example is the recent 
curtailing of oil subsidies in countries such as China, India and Indonesia, the main engines of 
oil demand growth in Asia over the coming years.72 Policies to combat air pollution and mitigate 
climate change could also favour a transition away from oil, and diesel in particular. France, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have recently announced a complete phase-out of 
conventional combustion engines over the next two decades, while China and India have 
declared their intent to follow this example.73 Security of supply concerns, coupled with a desire 
to become a forerunner in the clean energy race, the commercial race to become a leading 
supplier of clean energy technology, could further erode the status of oil in countries such as 
India and China.  
 
Together, structural changes in technology and markets are slowing down the demand for oil, 
which is heading for a peak, though the date at which this will actually be reached is highly 
uncertain. Moreover, a demand peak could very well be followed either by a long plateau or by 
a sudden plunge.74 Ultimately, however, if countries live up to the pledges made in the Paris 
Agreement to keep warming ‘well below 2°C’, oil demand must peak in the 2020s and decline 
at an increasing rate in the subsequent years.75 To keep the temperature rise below 2°C, around 
30 per cent of global oil reserves are deemed ‘unburnable’, even in a scenario that assumes 
widespread adoption of carbon capture and storage (CCS).76 Figure 3 shows the geographical 
distribution of unburnable oil reserves up to 2050 in a 2°C scenario with CCS, based on field 
production costs. The implications are huge: Canada should not touch any of its tar sands, the 
US should leave its tight oil reserves in the ground and the Arctic should be left entirely 
unexploited.  
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Figure 3: How much oil is unburnable in a 2°C scenario before 2050? 
 
Note: ‘Conv.’ and ‘Unconv.’ stand for conventional and unconventional oil resources, 
respectively.  
Source: Authors’ creation based on data from Christophe McGlade and Paul Ekins, ‘The 
geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global warming to 2°C’, Nature 
517: 7533, 2015, pp. 187–90. 
 
The new oil order 
The emergence of shale oil, together with major transformations on the demand side, imply that 
established beliefs about how the oil market functions are out of date. This in turn requires the 
principles and toolkits that were used to analyse the oil market in the past to be radically revised. 
In this section we reflect on how the rules of the game have changed from the perspective of 
oil producers. While private oil companies such as ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, Shell and Total 
are certainly affected by the shale revolution and structural shifts in demand,77 over 90 per cent 
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of global oil reserves are in state control, so our focus on oil-exporting states is warranted. We 
flag three key political effects from these market shifts: (1) key oil-producing states face 
economic and political turmoil; (2) OPEC cannot influence the price of oil in the long term by 
cutting output; and (3) power is redistributed in the international system. 
 
Resource governance in petrostates 
The first principle that needs to be reconsidered is the assertion that oil is an exhaustible 
resource. True as that may be from a geological perspective, the shale-driven transformation of 
oil supply and the looming reversal in oil demand growth make it highly unlikely that all of the 
world’s oil will ever be consumed. While OECD governments would thus earn less from the 
taxation of oil—according to OPEC data, more than 50 per cent of the oil price paid in the 
OECD consists of taxes78—the oil companies and exporting countries would be hit hardest. If 
oil consumption is ultimately constrained, there is no longer a strong reason to expect the 
relative price of oil to increase over time.79 The oil industry can thus end up with lower future 
revenues from their assets (the bursting of the ‘carbon bubble’), capital investments in oil 
infrastructure that cannot be recovered because of reduced demand or reduced prices (‘stranded 
assets’) and existing oil reserves that are left unexploited (‘unburnable oil reserves’).80  
 
For decades, oil-exporting countries have lived under the basic assumption of Hotelling’s rule 
of optimal extraction of exhaustible resources: the owner of oil can leave the resource in the 
ground as a physical asset or sell it and invest the proceeds in the financial markets. The upshot 
is that the price of an exhaustible resource has to grow at a rate that follows the interest rate.81 
The spectre of oil demand destruction, however, upends that view; producers might find out 
some day that oil under the ground is less valuable than oil produced and sold in the short term. 
This might encourage them to pump as much as they can, as fast as they can, to serve a shrinking 
market.82 While it makes sense for oil producers to speed up the rate of extraction, this is at best 
‘a short-term strategy to finance exploding deficits’, which ‘does nothing to improve growth 
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and development prospects’.83 Only a few producers can ramp up production in the short term 
and most will probably shy away from increased investment in exploration, which is typically 
made in anticipation of rising, not falling, demand.84 
 
Of course, natural resource wealth has not always led to good fortune for oil-rich countries. In 
theory, the loss of such oil rents could make the resource curse go ‘into reverse’.85 The problem, 
however, is that the transition is likely to be painful. Very few of the major oil exporters have 
followed the rule of Hartwick, which states that subsoil assets (e.g., oil reserves) should be 
transformed into reproducible surface assets (e.g., human or physical capital) to preserve long-
term per capita consumption.86 According to a World Bank study, in the period from 1980 to 
2005 no country that got more than 10 per cent of its GDP from oil and gas rents has followed 
the Hartwick rule and diversified its economy, except Malaysia.87 Oil-producing countries such 
as Venezuela, Nigeria, Brazil and Russia have experienced severe economic distress and 
political turmoil, related in part to the decline in oil revenues after 2014.88 To the extent that oil 
prices return to a lower level for longer in the face of slowing demand in the 2020s, this pattern 
is likely to spread, with severe risks for international geopolitical stability.  
 
The vulnerability of major oil producers to lower oil revenues in an age of abundance is a 
function of their oil-rent dependence, demography, economic base, history and political system. 
Saudi Arabia faces a difficult transition in the long run. It has some of the highest dependency 
rates on oil rents, in the order of 37 per cent of its GDP in the period 2012–2015.89 Keeping its 
young and growing population content will be a major challenge for the Al-Saud dynasty if oil 
revenues stay lower for longer.90 Iran, by contrast, has a much broader economic base, a longer 
tradition of trading, and lower fertility rates. Like Iraq, its oil production is well below its 
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potential owing to years of sanctions,91 which, ironically, might turn out to be an advantage in 
the long run. Russia is also a major loser from the shift away from oil. Even though it is less 
dependent on oil revenues than Saudi Arabia and some of the smaller Gulf states, its endemic 
corruption, autocratic tendencies and lack of a globally competitive industrial base will leave 
the Russian economy in a precarious state when oil revenues dry up.92 
 
OPEC’s role in oil market governance 
A second way in which the rules of the game will change is that the market mechanism—rather 
than OPEC or any other institution—will play a greater role in balancing oil supply and 
demand.93 Since the 2014 oil price drop many commentators have asked whether there is still 
a ‘swing producer’ that can absorb unexpected variations in demand or supply. Prior to the 
1970s, the Texas Railroad Commission had effectively operated as the world’s swing producer. 
In the 1970s, Texas passed the baton on to OPEC, and especially Saudi Arabia. The instrument 
through which Riyadh has managed to fulfil this role is ‘spare capacity’, usually defined as the 
volume of production that can be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 
days.94 Spare capacity acts as a buffer against price volatility and supply shocks, leading the 
IMF to describe it as a global public good.95  
 
However, OPEC’s historic decision, taken in November 2014, of ‘letting the market work’ led 
to a decline in OPEC’s effective spare capacity from more than 2 mb/d in 2014 to just over 1 
mb/d in 2016{9}.96 That decision, or rather non-decision, has been described as ‘an epochal 
moment’ and ‘the most important decision OPEC has taken since October 1973’, when the 
organization took over the pricing of its crude from international oil companies.97 The erosion 
of OPEC’s spare capacity meant that Saudi Arabia was no longer willing to play the role of 
market manager as it had done in the past. Instead, Riyadh wanted to shift the burden of 
balancing the market to other, high-cost producers. The change led the IEA to make the 
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remarkable statement in 2016 that ‘we are living in perhaps the first truly free oil market we 
have seen since the pioneering days of the industry’.98 
 
This situation led to much speculation about OPEC’s demise as a cartel,99 and the possibility of 
US shale producers taking over the role of ‘swing producer’. As noted above, the shale industry 
has some unique characteristics that make it more responsive than the traditional oil industry to 
price changes. However, the North American frackers are unable, by themselves, to assume the 
mantle of global swing producer. US oil production is made up of hundreds of independent 
companies, each of which is first and foremost seeking to maximize profits and offer a return 
to its shareholders. They respond to price impulses, and do not coordinate their production 
policies—indeed, to do so would be illegal under US anti-trust laws. And, finally, US shale 
production cannot swing as fast as Saudi spare capacity.100  
 
In 2017, however, the IEA concluded that ‘the great experiment’ had ended and that ‘market 
management’ had returned.101 Indeed, in late 2016 OPEC countries and eleven other producers 
crafted the most comprehensive output reduction agreement since 2008. The stated aim was to 
take 1.8 mb/d of oil production out of the market. In the face of resilient shale production in the 
United States, the production cuts have been extended until June 2018. Just like the 2008 
production cuts, however, the current extended OPEC plus non-OPEC agreement is more crisis 
management than market management. It is aimed at reducing the high level of inventories to 
rebalance the market in the short term; not at waging war against shale producers or avoiding a 
potential peak and subsequent decline in demand.102 In the course of 2017, Khalid Al-Falih, 
Saudi Arabia’s energy minister, repeatedly declared that OPEC will do ‘whatever it takes’ to 
balance the oil market, a reference to the famous words of Mario Draghi, the chairman of the 
European Central Bank{10}.103  
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Despite the ostensible shifts in tactics (from the ‘pump-at-will’ policy in 2014 to the ‘whatever-
it-takes’ strategy of late 2017), OPEC’s role has not fundamentally changed. The belief that 
OPEC can act as a market manager was never correct, because cheating is endemic in the self-
proclaimed cartel.104 OPEC, or rather Saudi Arabia, has only a certain amount of power to 
stabilize the market in response to temporary shocks to either demand or supply.105 At a speech 
in March 2017, Khalid Al-Falih explained that OPEC can intervene in the market only to 
address ‘short-term aberrations’ rather than ‘long-term structural imbalances’.106 In other 
words, OPEC will be unable to prop up the oil price in the long term by cutting output. As oil 
is being traded in a more competitive market environment, petrostates will face more pressure 
to diversify. Of course, timing is everything here. As we noted at the outset, the current 
resurgence in the oil price can be seen as the upturn of the next business cycle as markets tighten 
owing to a lack of investment since 2014, aggravated by geopolitical factors. However, there 
remains lurking in the background the impact of climate policy as an existential threat to future 
fossil fuel demand. How quickly that threat becomes reality remains to be seen; and there is no 
consensus on the speed of the energy transition.107 
 
Geopolitical power shifts 
The new oil order has the potential to redistribute power in the international system. The United 
States is already a clear winner. Thanks to surging shale production, it is the only major power 
that is moving steadily towards energy self-sufficiency by the 2020s. While this is not 
tantamount to autarky, and will not insulate the US from the vagaries of the international market 
as oil is priced globally and the US still imports a lot of oil, it nevertheless brings both strategic 
and economic benefits. Low energy prices have directly benefited the US economy, and the 
domestic energy revolution has also helped drive a decline in the US current account deficit, 
because of the reduced need for hydrocarbon imports.108 In strategic terms, the new shale-driven 
energy abundance has paved the way for international sanctions that eventually brought Iran 
back to the negotiating table and, ultimately, to the signing of an agreement over its nuclear 
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programme.109 The cushion of shale oil, along with the collapse of Libyan and Venezuelan oil 
output, also allowed the Trump administration in 2018 to pull back from the nuclear agreement 
with Iran and impose sanctions—although its decision to do so has created tensions between 
the EU and its other European allies, who remain major energy importers. 
 
As the United States is moving towards ‘energy independence’, or ‘energy dominance’, which 
the Trump administration has set as a goal, global oil trade flows are shifting to the Asian 
market, itself dominated by a few heavyweight national oil companies with considerable market 
power. Firms such as the Korea National Oil Company, the Indian Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation Limited and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation are state-owned 
companies that operate transnationally not primarily in search of markets but in search of 
resources.110 Over time, OPEC and other major exporters are thus likely to be confronted with 
a more oligopolistic market. The fierce bidding rivalry in 2016 between Russia’s Rosneft and 
Saudi Aramco over the acquisition of Indian refiner Essar, a state-of-the-art plant in the world’s 
fastest-growing fuel market, is illustrative in this respect. 
 
As Asia becomes increasingly dependent on the Middle East, it becomes more vulnerable to 
disruptions in what is arguably already the most volatile region in the world. Rising oil 
consumers such as China and India are not likely to see the US military domination of the 
Persian Gulf in entirely benign terms.111 Indeed, it is likely that the Chinese-led creation of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the associated ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative, which has 
been a priority of President Xi Jinping’s rule, stem in no small measure from such energy 
security concerns.112  
 
Much more than any other Great Power, China is banking on clean energy technologies to 
compete with US and Russian oil and gas and make China the renewable energy superpower 
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of the twenty-first century.113 It is already the world’s largest producer, exporter and installer 
of solar panels, wind turbines, batteries and electric vehicles. For China, the energy transition 
is a way to gain industrial advantage in sectors such as automotives where they have hitherto 
struggled to compete on a global basis. State Grid, China’s largest state-owned company, has 
plans to create a global supergrid, linking every continent with undersea transmission cables 
and powering the world with clean energy.114 China’s infrastructure diplomacy could be as 
important to shaping twenty-first-century geopolitics as the protection of sea lanes was to the 
hegemony of the United States in the twentieth century. 
 
Conclusions  
Many in the industry wish to explain the recent drop in oil prices as just the latest dip in a 
traditionally cyclical market. It may well be the case, as the IEA suggests, that the current period 
of low oil prices and reduced investments will lead to a tighter market in a few years’ time.115 
Yet it is important to separate out the short-term challenges created by growing supply, 
weakened demand and very high inventories from the long-run structural challenges 
represented by the shale revolution and climate policy, with its associated behavioural and 
technological changes. The latter, we argue, represent the beginnings of the end of the age of 
oil. 
 
The shale revolution essentially means that there is a lot of oil available on the global cost curve 
in the region of US$50–60 per barrel. Thus, even if Asian demand surges, which itself is 
uncertain, the market can find equilibrium at a lower price than was previously the case, 
notwithstanding geopolitical interventions. At the same time, since the Paris Agreement, and 
despite President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from that agreement,116 there 
is a global commitment to address climate change.117 In this context, the key uncertainty is not 
whether global oil demand will peak, but how soon it will peak and how quickly demand will 
fall thereafter. Again, the oil industry may wish to claim that peak demand is still decades away 
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and that the world will still need lots of oil and gas; but the reality is that shareholders, financial 
markets and central banks are all taking this challenge seriously now.  
 
As we noted at the beginning of this article, current thinking in IPE—both that which explicitly 
addresses energy issues and that which is unconsciously based on implicit assumptions about 
the role of the current fossil fuel system—is predicated on a narrative of fossil fuel ‘scarcity’ 
and competition, and often conflict, to secure access at a ‘reasonable’ price. The combined 
forces of unconventional oil and climate change policy, and the associated behavioural and 
technological change, represent an existential threat to the future of the fossil fuel system. The 
coal industry has been the first to face significant demand destruction, but in the coming decades 
both the oil and the gas industries are likely to face the same challenge.  
 
This offers huge opportunities for the field of IPE. Just as ‘business as usual’ is the most 
unlikely of future energy scenarios, so ‘theorization as usual’ may be found wanting in the 
emerging new energy age. The perspective of a gradual demise of the oil industry opens up a 
wide new research agenda. Is it possible for rentier states to diversify their economic base, given 
that only a few petrostates have managed to truly break free from their dependence on oil 
revenues? How will this affect state–society relations in such rentier states? Are we likely to 
see more intrastate conflict as the shift away from oil accelerates, and how will global 
geopolitical relations be affected? Will the growing financialization of oil make the oil world 
more vulnerable to financial shocks, and vice versa? This is only the beginning of a long list of 
questions that IPE scholars ought to address. 
 
